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I. INTRODUCTION
As a child, Perry Hopkins wanted to be president.1 After a court
convicted him of a non-violent drug felony, he lost more than his ability to
be president; he lost the ability to even cast a vote in a presidential
election.2 Hopkins vividly remembers the night when Barack Obama, a
fellow African-American man, became the first African-American
president, and how he celebrated the win with his neighbors, family, and
friends in the streets.3 The elation quickly subsided when someone looked
to him and said, “You got a record, you couldn’t vote. You can’t claim
this. You ain’t got nothing to do with this.”4
While Perry Hopkins eventually gained back his right to vote, other exfelons have not been so fortunate.5 Desmond Meade, who has lived in
Florida his entire life, has not been able to cast a vote since his release from
prison for a felony conviction.6 Despite serving his time, Meade could not
even vote for his own wife because of the felony conviction he received

1. See Rachel Martin, Debate Over Restoring Voting Rights to Ex-Felons, DIANE
REHM SHOW (May 12, 2016, 11:00 AM), http://thedianerehmshow.org/shows/2016-0512/felony-disenfranchisement (chronicling Hopkins’ life before he went to prison).
2. See Ian Simpson, U.S. States Giving More Ex-felons Voting Rights Back,
REUTERS (Mar. 22, 2016, 2:53 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-politicsfelons-idUSKCN0WO27H (detailing how a criminal background can impact a citizen’s
future in more ways than one).
3. See Martin, supra note 1 (recounting Hopkins’ emotions surrounding the
election night in 2008).
4. See id. (emphasizing the shame and stigma stemming from Hopkins’ felony
conviction).
5. See Voting Rights Restoration Efforts in Maryland, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUSTICE (Mar. 10, 2016), http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/voting-rightsrestoration-efforts-maryland (explaining Maryland’s recent law restoring voting rights
to felons who are completing probation or parole).
6. See Alice Miranda Ollstein, More Than 1.5 Million Florida Voters Will Be
Missing From Tuesday’s Primary, THINK PROGRESS (Mar. 14, 2016),
https://thinkprogress.org/more-than-1-5-million-florida-voters-will-be-missing-fromtuesdays-primary-ec745315b6c8#.sxlvdkmnh (describing Meade’s personal life and
connection to politics that have influenced his fight for felon voting rights).
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more than ten years ago.7
Perry Hopkins and Desmond Meade are two of nearly 6.1 million exfelons that face nearly insurmountable barriers when trying to gain back
their right to vote.8 Six states currently disenfranchise more than seven
percent of its adult population.9
Although only four states completely disenfranchise felons, a mass
majority of states still place some restriction on felons ability to vote.10
Only two states, Maine and Vermont, allow ex-felons to vote while they
are still in prison.11 As of 2016, fourteen states allowed felons to vote after
being released from prison, four states permitted felons to vote after being
released from prison and completing parole, eighteen allowed felons to
vote after being released from prison, completing parole, and completing
probation, while twelve states required a combination of completing prison
sentences, completing parole, completing probation, and completing a
waiting period.12
This Comment argues that restrictive felony disenfranchisement laws
violate the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.13 Part II
describes the current felon voting rights laws in Florida, Tennessee, and
Pennsylvania.14 Part II also describes past attempts to challenge felon
disenfranchisement laws in the United States Supreme Court, as well as in
State courts.15 Part III compares the felon disenfranchisement laws in

7. See id. (chronicling how Meade lost his voting rights and was unable to vote
for his wife, who was the youngest African-American woman in Florida to become a
state legislator).
8. See CHRISTOPHER UGGEN ET AL., 6 MILLION LOST VOTERS: STATE-LEVEL
ESTIMATES OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT, 2016 at 3 (The Sent’g Project 2016)
(highlighting the number of felons currently disenfranchised in the United States).
9. See id. (referring to Alabama, Florida, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee, and
Virginia).
10. See Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States, THE SENTENCING
PROJECT
1
(Apr.
28,
2014),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/12/Felony-Disenfranchisement-Laws-in-the-US.pdf (discussing
challenges to felon disenfranchisement laws).
11. See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 4 (describing how Maine and Vermont
permit all citizens to vote, despite a criminal conviction).
12. See Simpson, supra note 2 (highlighting the most lenient states with respect to
felon voting rights laws).
13. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (establishing that it is unconstitutional to inflict
cruel and unusual punishments).
14. See infra Part II (comparing the felon voting rights laws of Pennsylvania to
both Florida and Tennessee).
15. See infra Part II (discussing the Fourteenth Amendment, the Voting Rights Act
of 1965, and the Eighth Amendment).
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Pennsylvania to the restrictive laws enacted in Florida and Tennessee,
highlighting the clear oppressive nature of the laws.16 Part III further
asserts that the more restrictive laws of Florida and Tennessee constitute
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.17 Part IV
recommends that these restrictive laws encouraging felony
disenfranchisement be eliminated.18 Part V concludes by reiterating that
the laws in Florida and Tennessee fully deprive ex-felons of the right to
vote and should constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment.19
II. BACKGROUND
A. State Felon Disenfranchisement Laws
1. Florida
Florida alone accounts for nearly half of the post-sentence felons
disenfranchised nationally, with nearly 1.5 million disenfranchised in the
state.20 Florida’s implementation of laws that prevent felons from voting
goes back to its 1838 Constitution.21
The Florida Constitution outright excludes any felon or mentally
incompetent person from voting until his or her rights are restored. 22
Florida law provides that a governor, with the approval of two members of
the Cabinet, may grant either full or conditional pardons to felons,
commute their punishment, or restore their civil rights.23 Additionally, any
16. See infra Part III (demonstrating the differences in how felons are treated
state-to-state and the clear hardship felons face after completing their sentences and
serving their time).
17. See infra Part III (suggesting that where challenges to the First Amendment,
Fourteenth Amendment, and Voting Rights Act of 1965 fail, the Eighth Amendment
should succeed).
18. See infra Part IV (voicing the unfairness of restrictive felon
disenfranchisement laws and recommending that states adopt Pennsylvania’s felon
voting rights laws).
19. See infra Part V (concluding that the Eighth Amendment should be an avenue
to repealing felon disenfranchisement laws).
20. See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 3, 13 (highlighting that, of the 1.5 million
felons disenfranchised in Florida, only 271,982 restorations have been given from
1990-2015).
21. See Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1218 (11th Cir. 2005)
(discussing the trend of felon disenfranchisement laws in Florida and its long history).
22. See FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (placing limitations on certain people deemed
ineligible to vote in Florida).
23. See FLA. STAT. § 940.01 (2003) (explaining the options available to a governor
when presented with an individual felon).
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person convicted of a felony may petition to restore his rights if certain
conditions are met.24
A Floridian felon’s right to vote is not lost forever, as he may seek
clemency to restore his rights.25 The Florida Constitution vests clemency
power in the Governor.26 A governor has the discretion to restore the right
to vote to some felons, while denying that right to others.27 Currently, all
convicted criminals, regardless of the felony committed, must wait five to
seven years after completing their sentence before they may begin the
voting restoration process through the governor and the appointed
clemency board.28
2. Tennessee
Much like Florida, Tennessee currently disenfranchises 421,227 felons.29
In Tennessee, felons that commit certain felonies are completely
disenfranchised, whereas others not convicted of other felonies may apply
to the Board of Probate and Parole for restoration.30 The Tennessee
Constitution requires that elections be free and equal, and voting rights not
be denied unless a person commits an “infamous crime.”31 If not convicted
of an infamous crime, a felon in Tennessee may have full rights of
citizenship restored upon: (1) receiving a pardon that does not contain a
24. See FLA. STAT. § 940.05 (2014) (explaining that restoration will be granted
only by receiving a pardon, serving the maximum sentence imposed, or being granted
release by the Florida Commission).
25. See Verity v. Scott, No. 2:12–cv–609–FtM–38, 2014 WL 3053171, at *1
(M.D. Fla. July 7, 2014) (discussing Florida’s clemency rules, which previously
restored voting rights automatically to individuals convicted of non-violent crimes that
served their sentence, but now requires felons to wait five to seven years after
completion of their sentence to apply for restoration).
26. See FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 8(a) (providing that the clemency process is solely
an executive branch function).
27. See Beacham v. Braterman, 300 F. Supp. 182, 184 (S.D. Fla. 1969) (ruling that
a man who was refused the right to register, solely because he was a convicted felon,
was constitutional).
28. See Verity, 2014 WL 3053171, at *1 (explaining the expansion of the
clemency rules put into place under Governor Scott).
29. See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 13, 15 (restoring only 11,581 out of
421,227 ex-felons voting rights during 1990-2015).
30. See O’Neal v. Goins, No. M2015-01337-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 4083466, at
*1, *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 29, 2016) (dismissing the complaint by an ex-felon who
argued that allowing discretional approval by the court for restoration of voting rights
was unconstitutional).
31. See TENN. CONST. art. I, § 5 (allowing felonies of murder, rape, treason, or
voter fraud to deny a felon of civil rights but allowing those not convicted of those
crimes to restore voting rights through court order or certificate of restoration).
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position on suffrage; (2) completion of a sentence imposed for the
infamous crime; or (3) receiving final release from incarceration or
supervision.32
Tennessee has perhaps the most perplexing felony disenfranchisement
laws in the United States.33 Felon disenfranchisement laws in Tennessee
require that those convicted before 1986 petition to the court while
prosecutors are given an opportunity to object; those convicted after 1996
are subject to the same rules except those convicted of infamous crimes;
and those convicted between 1986 and 1996 may petition for
administrative restoration of rights, without a potentially adversarial
hearing.34 People convicted after 1996 are subject to the same rules, except
that those convicted of infamous crimes in Tennessee are permanently
disenfranchised.35 Additionally, Tennessee also requires that an ex-felon
pay his court-ordered victim restitution and child support obligations to
regain voting rights.36
3. Pennsylvania
As of 2016, Pennsylvania disenfranchises 52,974 felons.37 However,
Pennsylvania is one of fourteen states that only disenfranchises felons
during their prison sentences.38 The Pennsylvania Constitution provides
that men are born equally free and independent, obtaining certain inherent
and indefeasible rights.39
Moreover, the Pennsylvania Constitution stresses that no power, civil or

32. See id. (listing the circumstances in which a person who has not committed an
infamous crime may regain their full rights).
33. See Voting Rights Restoration Efforts in Tennessee, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUSTICE (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/voting-rightsrestoration-efforts-tennessee (discussing the state’s felon voting laws).
34. See id. (highlighting the complicated process for felons to regain their voting
rights in Tennessee).
35. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-29-105(c)(2)(B) (2013) (defining infamous crimes
as murder, rape, treason, or voter fraud).
36. See id. § 40-29-202(b)(1)-(2) (2013); Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 753
(6th Cir. 2010) (holding that requiring a felon to pay $40,000 restitution for wire fraud
and more than $1,000 in child support prior to restoration is constitutional).
37. See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 15 (highlighting that those 52,974 felons
make up 0.52 percent of the adult population).
38. See id. (demonstrating that Pennsylvania is one of the more lenient states with
respect to felon disenfranchisement).
39. See PA. CONST. art. I, § 1 (stressing that certain rights are so fundamental that
all people should equally receive them, including enjoying and defending life and
liberty).
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military, should interfere or prevent the exercise of the right of suffrage.40
However, those who meet the age and residency requirements are allowed
to vote unless the General Assembly enacts laws, within its powers, that
regulate the registration of electors.41
Pennsylvania election code does not explicitly disenfranchise
incarcerated prisoners.42 However, sections 102(w) and 1301 define a
qualified absentee elector and provide that the definition shall exclude
“persons confined in a penal institution.”43 Despite the exclusion of
incarcerated prisoners, this provision does not violate the Constitution.44
Federal courts determined that the Code could not possibly violate the
Constitution by denying incarcerated felons the right to vote while
permitting those not incarcerated to do so.45 Because lawful incarceration
brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and
rights, requiring some form of felon disenfranchisement is constitutional.46
It is not the function of the court to superintend the treatment and discipline
of incarcerated felons, but only to free those who are improperly
confined.47
Although Pennsylvania now does not disenfranchise felons who have
completed their sentences, the state was not always so progressive.48 The
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court (one of the two statewide intermediate
appellate courts in Pennsylvania) found that no rational basis existed to

40. See PA. CONST. art. I, § 5 (reiterating the importance of allowing
Pennsylvania’s citizens their right to vote).
41. See PA. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (expressing that, while voting is a fundamental
right in Pennsylvania, federal law dictates that states can only regulate certain aspects
of the process).
42. See Martin v. Haggerty, 548 A.2d 371, 373-74 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988)
(discussing the lack of felon disenfranchisement laws in Pennsylvania).
43. See 25 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2602 (West 2012) (effectively
disqualifying only incarcerated felons from voting).
44. See Owens v. Barnes, 711 F.2d 25, 27 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding Pennsylvania
provisions do not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
45. See id. (upholding the Pennsylvania provision because it only disenfranchised
a small portion of felons and granted rights to non-incarcerated felons in general).
46. See id. at 27-28 (holding that it was constitutional to deny incarcerated felons
the right to vote while simultaneously allowing non-incarcerated felons to vote).
47. See Ray v. Pennsylvania, 263 F. Supp. 630, 631 (W.D. Pa. 1967) (citing Hoge
v. Maroney, 211 F. Supp. 197, 198 (W.D. Pa. 1962)) (arguing that a felon cannot vote
while incarcerated because only when fundamental, humane, and necessary rights are
breached will constitutional protections become involved).
48. See Mixon v. Commonwealth, 759 A.2d 442, 445 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000)
(discussing the Pennsylvania Voter Registration Act which denies a felon the right to
vote unless he been out of prison for over five years).
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preclude the registration of those incarcerated within the last five years
when those legally registered prior to incarceration may vote upon their
release.49
B. Attempts to Provide Voting Rights to Felons in the United States
1. The Fourteenth Amendment
Felon disenfranchisement laws challenged under the Fourteenth
Amendment have largely failed.50 Generally, under the Fourteenth
Amendment, political suffrage is not considered an absolute or natural
right.51 Rather, state constitutions and statutes confer the right of political
suffrage, making that right subject to exclusive regulation by the state.52
Although courts generally deem the right to vote fundamental, the courts
have not found it fundamental when evaluating felon disenfranchisement
laws.53 The United States Supreme Court looked to the prevalence of felon
disenfranchisement laws during the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
to justify the upholding of felon disenfranchisement laws.54
The
prevalence of felon disenfranchisement laws at the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment led the Court to find that the crafters clearly did
not think these types of laws violated due process.55
2. Voting Rights Act (Act) of 1965
Courts have also examined the constitutionality of felon
disenfranchisement laws under the Voting Rights Act of 1965.56 Although

49. See id. at 451 (holding the Pennsylvania Voter Registration Act section at issue
unconstitutional).
50. See Robin Miller, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of State
Criminal Disenfranchisement Provisions, 10 A.L.R. 6th 31 §§ 8-10 (2006) (listing the
challenges to the Fourteenth Amendment).
51. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 53 (1974) (rationalizing that state
requirements on age and residence show that a previous criminal record can also be
taken into consideration); see also State ex. rel. Olson v. Langer, 256 N.W. 377, 385
(N.D. 1934) (explaining that voting rights are restricted for minors, therefore, states can
restrict voting rights for felons, too).
52. See Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (giving states
the power to enact felon disenfranchisement laws).
53. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560, 561-62 (1964) (explaining that the
right of suffrage is a fundamental right).
54. See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 48-49 (recognizing that, after the Civil War, every
confederate state had to submit a state constitution—many of which were approved
with felon disenfranchisement laws).
55. See id. (stressing the importance of the crafter’s intent in the creation of laws).
56. See Miller, supra note 50, at §§ 14-15 (listing the challenges under the Voting
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felon disenfranchisement laws generally do not violate the Act, courts have
not determined whether the Act could be an avenue for finding specific
felon disenfranchisement laws unconstitutional.57 The United States
Supreme Court has recognized that the Act’s purpose was to rid any
disparate racial impact of facially neutral voting requirements.58 In line
with this ruling, the Ninth Circuit further found that if felon
disenfranchisement laws were enacted to discriminate on the basis of race,
then that may violate the Voting Rights Act of 1965.59
The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged the potential
success of future felon disenfranchisement challenges under the Act and
provides that it could afford disenfranchised felons the means to seek
redress in limited circumstances.60 Despite the Supreme Court’s glimpse of
hope for challenging these types of laws under the Act, both the Second
and Eleventh Circuits have found that the Act does not prohibit the
disenfranchisement of felons.61
3. Cruel and Unusual Punishment and the Eighth Amendment
Judges and academics have debated the proper interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause for some
time.62 If the courts interpret the Eighth Amendment by the standards at
the time of ratification, it may only refer to the most egregious of
Rights Act of 1965 that deal with disparate, discriminatory effects of felon
disenfranchisement laws).
57. See id. (explaining that the Voting Rights Act has not been completely
eliminated as a route to challenge felon disenfranchisement when the laws discriminate
based on race).
58. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 231-33 (1985) (holding that if any
voting qualifications denied citizens the right to vote based on race, they would be
considered unconstitutional).
59. See Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1016 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding
that a claim that felony disenfranchisement provisions violate the Act is cognizable
under certain circumstances, such as racial bias, where Alabama discriminated against
African-Africans when disenfranchising felons).
60. See Hunter, 471 U.S. at 233 (holding that although Richardson v. Ramirez,
418 U.S. 24, 49 (1974) allows states to deprive felons the right to vote, 52 U.S.C. §
10301 (2016) allows felons to challenge disenfranchisement laws if discrimination
occurs).
61. See Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1234 (11th Cir. 2005)
(holding that the Act generally does not prohibit felon disenfranchisement laws);
Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 129-30 (2d Cir. 2004) (upholding the felon
disenfranchisement statute because finding it unconstitutional would alter the balance
between the states and the Federal Government).
62. See Miller, supra note 50, at § 7 (stressing the complexity of the Eighth
Amendment).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2017

9

American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 3
HEATH 3/9/2017(DO NOT DELETE)

336

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

5/23/2017 6:59 PM

[Vol. 25:3

punishments.63 Alternatively, if courts interpret the Eighth Amendment
with a modern viewpoint, they would do so by looking at “evolving
standards of decency.”64
Since the adoption of the Bill of Rights, the Supreme Court has extended
the Eighth Amendment to cover less traditional cruel and unusual
punishments three times.65 The first case adjudging a punishment to be
cruel and unusual punishment occurred when a man was sentenced to
fifteen years imprisonment for falsifying a public and official document.66
The Court chose to administer a modern interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment.67
The second case adjudicating a punishment to be within the confines of
cruel and unusual punishment occurred when a United States Army private
was convicted of desertion, and sentenced to three years hard labor, loss of
all pay and allowances, and a dishonorable discharge.68 Trop later applied
for a passport but was denied under Section 401(g) of the amended 1940
Nationality Act.69 The Court extended the Eighth Amendment, finding the
punishment to be cruel and unusual.70
The third case declaring a punishment falls under the cruel and unusual
punishment clause involved a state statute making addiction of narcotics a
criminal offense.71 The Court determined that laws imprisoning people
afflicted with narcotic addictions constituted cruel and unusual

63. See id. (discussing the history of the Eighth Amendment).
64. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101-02 (1958) (accepting a modern

interpretation of the Eighth Amendment that would allow a court to see what actions
are considered cruel and unusual based on what society at that point in time finds cruel
and unusual).
65. See Miller, supra note 50, at § 7 (explaining the very narrow range of Eighth
Amendment application that generally focus on death penalty procedures or excessive
physical punishment).
66. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 359 (1910) (holding that
punishments must be proportionate to the crime).
67. See id. at 373-74 (explaining that a principle, to be vital, must be capable of
wider application).
68. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 87-88 (detailing how Trop willingly surrendered to an
officer after deserting the army for less than a day).
69. See id. (explaining that Trop lost his citizenship under the 1940 Nationality
Act due to his conviction and dishonorable discharge for wartime desertion).
70. See id. at 101 (expanding cruel and unusual punishment to include expatriation
because his crime should not cause him to lose his citizenship).
71. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 661-62 (1962) (explaining that
Robinson was arrested and charged after an officer saw scar tissue and discoloration on
his arms, which are consistent with signs of addiction to narcotics).
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punishment.72 The Court provided that if addiction was criminal, then “to
be mentally ill, or a leper, or to be afflicted with a venereal disease” also
had the potential to be criminalized.73
Felon disenfranchisement does not neatly fit into any of the previously
mentioned cases where the Court identified cruel and unusual
punishment.74 Generally, felon disenfranchisement matches closest with
Trop v. Dulles and the punishment of expatriation.75 However, depriving
felons of voting rights is often not viewed as a punishment, but rather a
non-penal exercise of the state’s power to regulate the franchise.76 The
legislature and the states, alternatively, find that evidence would exist if the
framers considered disenfranchisement laws punishment.77 Because a
majority of the states exclude felons from voting, courts refuse to consider
these statutes cruel and unusual punishment.78
III. ANALYSIS
A. A Comparison of Pennsylvania to Florida and Tennessee’s Laws
Demonstrates That the Latter States Unfairly Disenfranchise Ex-Felon
Voters
Both Florida and Tennessee, unlike Pennsylvania, place nearly
insurmountable barriers on a felon who is trying to gain back his right to
vote.79 While Florida and Tennessee boast more than two million

72. See id. at 666 (finding that statutes violate cruel and unusual punishment when
they criminalize illnesses which may be contracted innocently or involuntarily).
73. See id. (cautioning about the slippery slope that would occur if the addiction
criminalization statute were upheld).
74. See Miller, supra note 50, at § 7 (discussing the struggle of arguing the
unconstitutionality of felon disenfranchisement laws under the Eighth Amendment).
75. But see, e.g. Thiess v. State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 387 F. Supp. 1038,
1043 (D. Md. 1974) (allowing for the disenfranchisement of persons convicted of
infamous crimes).
76. See Green v. Bd. of Elections of N.Y., 380 F.2d 445, 452 (2d Cir. 1967)
(holding the felon disenfranchisement laws are non-violative of the Eighth Amendment
as they do not incur a harm egregious enough to be considered cruel and unusual).
77. See id. (stressing the popularity of felon disenfranchisement laws at the
ratification of the Bill of Rights).
78. See El-Amin v. McDonnell, No. 3:12-cv-005380-JAG, 2013 WL 1193357, at
*1, *6-7 (E.D. Va. Mar. 22, 2013) (finding widespread enactment of laws proves that
they are not cruel and unusual punishment).
79. Compare 25 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2602 (West 2012) (restricting
incarcerated felons in Pennsylvania from voting), with FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4
(allowing voting rights to be restored discretionally by the Governor), and TENN.
CONST. art. I, § 5 (allowing restoration through court ordered approval).
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disenfranchised voters combined, Pennsylvania disenfranchises a modest
amount of less than fifty-three thousand.80 This astronomically unequal
amount of disenfranchised voters is not shocking when looking at the laws
in place in each of these states.81 Pennsylvania’s state Constitution
mentions nothing about felon voting prohibitions, whereas both Florida and
Tennessee actively choose to mention felon restrictions throughout their
state Constitutions.82
Pennsylvania, Florida, and Tennessee all implement some voting
restriction on felons at various points in a felon’s journey through the
conviction, sentencing, parole, and rehabilitative process.83 However,
unlike Florida and Tennessee, Pennsylvania’s state Constitution and laws
encourage people to register and exercise their right to vote.84 The
Pennsylvania Constitution highlights the importance of voting in order to
keep a free, democratic society.85 It articulates that only the state itself may
regulate laws that prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage.86
Although Pennsylvania recognizes that it retains the right to create laws
that disenfranchise voters like felons, Pennsylvania has generally chosen
not to enact more restrictive laws.87
80. See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 15 (demonstrating Florida and Tennessee
disenfranchise more than eight percent of population, while Pennsylvania
disenfranchises only 0.52 percent).
81. Compare 25 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2602 (West 2012) (indicating
that only incarcerated felons are restricted from voting in Pennsylvania), with Fla.
Const. art. VI, § 4 (restricting voting rights for convicted felons unless they were
restored by a governor), and TENN. CONST. art. I, § 5 (requiring discretionally given
court ordered approval of voting rights).
82. Compare PA. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (mentioning only that Pennsylvania’s
General Assembly maintains the right to create other voting related laws, but does not
specify that they must be related to felon disenfranchisement), with FLA. CONST. art.
VI, § 4 (stating that no person convicted of a felony is capable of voting without direct
restoration from the Governor), and TENN. CONST. art. I, § 5 (mentioning directly that
people convicted of certain felonies are immediately disenfranchised).
83. See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 4 (providing a current summary of state
felon disenfranchisement restrictions).
84. See PA. CONST. art. I, § 1 (providing that “all men are born equally free and
independent . . . .”).
85. See PA. CONST. art. I, § 5 (reiterating the importance of the right to vote by
placing few limitations on voters).
86. See PA. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (mentioning how states can enact laws denying the
right to vote).
87. Compare Mixon v. Commonwealth, 759 A.2d 442, 445-46 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2000) (rejecting a law that placed more restrictions on felon voting rights), with Verity
v. Scott, No. 2:12-cv-609-FtM-38, 2014 WL 3053171, at *1 (M.D. Fla. July 7, 2014)
(opting not to consider whether a waiting period of five to seven years after completing
sentencing is unconstitutional).
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In fact, in Pennsylvania’s state Constitution, felon disenfranchisement is
not referenced at all; the only time felon disenfranchisement is mentioned
is in the Pennsylvania Election Code’s definition of a “qualified absentee
voter.”88 Even when a person has challenged a felon disenfranchisement
law in Pennsylvania, the courts have denied the claims as being
unconstitutional because clearly the disenfranchisement laws were so
limited a court could not consider them excessive.89 Pennsylvania’s lenient
felon disenfranchisement laws allow an ex-felon to regain his voting rights
the moment he completes his sentence, unlike Florida and Tennessee.90
The only way Pennsylvania could implement more lenient felon
disenfranchisement laws would be to have no restrictions whatsoever on a
felon’s voting rights during incarceration.91 Since its first ratification in
1776, the Pennsylvania Constitution has allowed the state to create
disenfranchisement laws so long as it resides within the framework of the
Pennsylvania Constitution.92 The United States Supreme Court has argued
that because felon disenfranchisement laws have existed throughout United
States’ history, the founders must have considered these laws constitutional
and within a state’s power to regulate.93 However, the Court has ignored
that other states, like Pennsylvania, were choosing to implement these laws
in a less restrictive manner.94
While the law requires some rights to be given during a prison sentence,
88. Compare FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (stating that any felon or mentally
incompetent person can be prevented from voting until his or her rights have been
restored by a governor or clemency board), with Martin v. Haggerty, 548 A.2d 371,
373 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) (explaining that only the definition of “qualified absentee
elector” in the Pennsylvania Election Code does not include persons confined to a
penal institution or mental institution).
89. See Owens v. Barnes, 711 F.2d 25, 27 (3d Cir. 1983) (denying an incarcerated
felon voting rights while allowing an un-incarcerated felon to vote is not
unconstitutional).
90. See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 4 (recognizing that twelve states restrict a
felon’s voting rights through parole, probation, and post-sentence while fourteen states
restrict a felon’s voting rights only during the period of incarceration).
91. See id. (highlighting that, if Pennsylvania’s laws were any more lenient they
would have no restriction whatsoever, like Maine and Vermont).
92. See PA. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (explaining that the Pennsylvania Constitution
already dictates that age and residency are factors to be considered in voting laws, so
the General Assembly could also craft laws that disenfranchise others, like felons).
93. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 48-49 (1974) (examining felon
voting rights at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and evaluating the Framer’s
intent when crafting the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment).
94. See Mixon v. Commonwealth, 759 A.2d 442, 445-46 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000)
(rejecting the five year waiting period law that placed more restrictions on felon voting
rights).
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a mass majority of the states recognize that voting rights do not have to be
provided during a prison sentence.95 However, states like Tennessee and
Florida choose to continue to suppress a felon’s right to vote long after he
or she has been released.96 Unlike Florida and Tennessee, Pennsylvania
also has chosen to provide this previously restricted right back to an exfelon at the first opportunity available.97 After all, the United States
Supreme Court has held that the right to vote freely is the essence of a
democratic society and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of a
representative government.98 Unlike Tennessee and Florida, Pennsylvania
recognizes that the denial of voting rights to felons should only be used in
the most limited of circumstances.99
Despite recognizing that some suppression of voting rights for felons is
constitutional, Pennsylvania courts have been quick to revoke felon
disenfranchisement laws that place unnecessary burdens on felons, which is
significantly different than other states.100
When faced with the
Pennsylvania Voting Rights Act that required a waiting period for exfelons to regain their rights back, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth court

95. See Ray v. Pennsylvania, 263 F. Supp. 630, 631 (W.D. Pa. 1967) (explaining
that incarcerated felons have rights like the right to unlimited access to the courts but
not the right to vote); see also UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 4.
96. See TENN. CONST. art. I, § 5 (requiring petitions through the courts for
restoration); see also FLA. STAT. § 940.05 (2014) (requiring a pardon, service of the
maximum sentence imposed, or release by Florida’s Commission before petitioning for
restoration).
97. Compare FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (excluding any felon or mentally
incompetent person from voting until his or her rights have been restored by a governor
or clemency board), and TENN. CONST. art. I, § 5 (allowing felons not convicted of
infamous crimes to restore voting rights through court order or certificate of
restoration), with Ray, 263 F. Supp. at 631 (restoring voting rights once released from
incarceration).
98. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (holding that the right of
suffrage is a fundamental right).
99. Compare Owens v. Barnes, 711 F.2d 25, 27 (3d Cir. 1983) (allowing a
disenfranchisement provision because it only disenfranchised a small portion of
felons), with Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 753 (6th Cir. 2010) (requiring
payment of debts before being allowed to restore voting rights), and Verity v. Scott,
No. 2:12–cv–609–FtM–38, 2014 WL 3053171, at *1 (M.D. Fla. July 7, 2014)
(discussing a five to seven year waiting period after completion of sentencing, parole,
or probation).
100. Compare Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1217-18 (11th Cir.
2005) (declaring felon disenfranchisement constitutional because this power is given to
state governments), and Bredesen, 624 F.3d at 753 (requiring that felons who want to
regain voting rights to pay restitution), with Mixon v. Commonwealth, 759 A.2d 442,
451-52 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000) (rejecting a law that places waiting periods on felons).
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chose to overrule it.101 The court reiterated that it made no sense to install a
waiting period on some but not all felons.102 Pennsylvania’s felon
disenfranchisement laws are ideal, as Pennsylvania recognizes the
importance of voting but also acknowledges that under certain
circumstances, the right to vote should be denied.103
Pennsylvania’s laws serve as a stark contrast when compared against
Florida and Tennessee’s felon disenfranchisement laws.104 Florida boasts
the most disenfranchised group of voters in America with nearly 1.5
million disenfranchised felons.105 Tennessee only disenfranchises 421,277
ex-felons; however, this still accounts for over eight percent of its adult
population.106 Combined, both Florida and Tennessee disenfranchise
nearly two million ex-felons.107
Both Florida and Tennessee enacted laws denying those convicted of
infamous crimes from voting.108 Currently, no person convicted of any
infamous crime in Florida is allowed to vote until the governor restores his
civil rights.109 This greatly contrasts with Tennessee, where those
convicted of the infamous crimes of murder, rape, treason, or voter fraud
are permanently disenfranchised.110 Unlike Pennsylvania, where felons
must merely finish their prison sentence, both Florida and Tennessee place
their felons into categories that determine when voting rights can be
101. See Mixon, 759 A.2d at 445, 451-52 (denying Pennsylvania’s rational basis
test because there is no valid reason a felon is better equipped to vote five years after
completing his sentence).
102. See id. at 451 (rationalizing that it “could not disenfranchise similarly situated
blue eyed-felons but not brown-eyed felons”).
103. See Barnes, 711 F.2d at 27 (recognizing times when voting rights should be
withheld, including during incarceration).
104. Compare PA. CONST. art. I, § 5 (stressing the importance of suffrage), with
FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (placing limitations that exclude a person voting in Florida),
and TENN. CONST. art. I, § 5 (restricting those who commit certain crimes from voting).
105. See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 3 (comparing the amount of felons
disenfranchised in Florida to other states).
106. See id. at 15 (revealing that only Florida and Virginia have more
disenfranchised felons than Tennessee).
107. See id. at 13, 15 (noting that during the period of 1990-2015 both states have
only voting rights to 283,563 out of nearly two million disenfranchised felons).
108. Compare FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (excluding those who committed infamous
crimes, e.g. any felony, from voting), with TENN. CONST. art. I, § 5 (defining infamous
crimes as murder, rape, treason, or voter fraud).
109. See FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (explaining that the governor has no set guidelines
when determining who to restore voting rights to, excluding those convicted of
infamous crimes).
110. See TENN. CONST. art. I, § 5 (expressing the limited crimes that are considered
infamous).
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restored, if ever.111 Permanently disenfranchising a felon who committed
murder or rape is far less of an injustice than permanently disenfranchising
a felon who committed an astronomically less morally offensive crime,
such as a non-violent drug felony.112
While Tennessee denies a felon the right to vote because he has
committed a horrendous crime like rape or murder, Florida denies felons
who commit crimes, such as a non-violent drug offense or bribery, from
voting almost permanently.113 This partially accounts for the high amount
of disenfranchised felons in Florida.114
The Florida courts have
consistently chosen to ignore the astronomical amount of disenfranchised
felons despite having a clear record that these types of laws are racially
discriminative.115 Florida courts have reasoned that the denial of voting
rights following a felony conviction is a longstanding and quite common
practice.116 While this reasoning is true, even Pennsylvania recognizes that
placing insurmountable barriers that result in a complete and permanent
denial of a voter’s rights does not create a better society.117
In order to maintain their 1.5 million disenfranchised voters in Florida, a
waiting period of five to seven years is often required after the completion

111. Compare 25 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2602 (West 2012) (excluding
only those persons currently incarcerated from voting), with FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4
(excluding those convicted of infamous crimes, e.g. any felony, from voting), and
TENN. CONST. art. I, § 5 (defining infamous crimes as murder, rape, treason, or voter
fraud).
112. See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 3 (noting Florida’s restrictive voting laws
as part of the reason that Florida’s disenfranchises 1.5 million voters). Compare FLA.
CONST. art. VI, § 4 (excluding any felon from voting), with TENN. CONST. art. I, § 5
(defining those who commit only the most egregious crimes).
113. Compare FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (requiring that all those who commit felonies
are subject to permanent disenfranchisement), with TENN. CONST. art. I, § 5 (limiting
infamous crimes to only the most egregious crimes, such as rape or murder).
114. See Voting Rights Restoration in Florida, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Oct. 6,
2016), http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/voting-rights-restoration-efforts-florida
(dictating that the clock resets if an individual is arrested for even a misdemeanor
during the waiting period, even if no charges are filed).
115. See Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1218-19 (11th Cir. 2005)
(allowing laws because the legislative history did not show intent to discriminate
despite the effects of the law).
116. See Beacham v. Braterman, 300 F. Supp. 182, 184 (S.D. Fla. 1969)
(highlighting that while the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment were being
adopted, felon disenfranchisement laws persisted uniformly).
117. See Mixon v. Commonwealth, 759 A.2d 442, 451, 445 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000)
(finding that there is no rational basis for denying previously unregistered felons the
right to register for five years when previously registered felons are not subjected to an
equal waiting period).
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of incarceration, probation, and parole before a felon can even begin the
process of restoring his voting rights.118 However, even if a felon waits the
required minimum five years, a governor, with the help of his Clemency
Board, may decide to give him back the right to vote discretionally.119 This
discretion, in addition to the mandatory waiting period, prevents most
felons in Florida from ever gaining their right to vote back.120
Although Tennessee does not have a mandatory waiting period,
Tennessee requires felons not convicted of the infamous crimes of rape,
murder, treason, or voter fraud to apply for a court order to restore voting
rights.121 While Tennessee’s felon disenfranchisement laws seem to
require a simple process for an ex-felon to follow, its application is far
more complicated.122 Like in Florida, a court in Tennessee retains the right
to restore an ex-felon’s voting rights discretionally.123
Unlike in
Pennsylvania, a series of complex exceptions make it difficult for convicted
felons in both Tennessee and Florida to ascertain when a felon might regain
his right to vote.124 Specifically, the felon disenfranchisement laws in
Tennessee require that those convicted before 1986 petition to the court
while prosecutors are given an opportunity to object; those convicted after
1996 are subject to the same rules but those convicted of infamous crimes
are permanently disenfranchised; and those convicted between 1986 and

118. See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 3-4 (highlighting that Florida
disenfranchises nearly 1.5 million individuals who are in prison, on probation, or on
parole). Compare Mixon, 759 A.2d at 445-46 (considering whether waiting periods
violate the Pennsylvania constitution), with Verity v. Scott, No. 2:12-cv-609-FtM-38,
2014 WL 3053171, at *5-10 (M.D. Fla. July 7, 2014) (choosing not to acknowledge the
five to seven year waiting period in place in Florida as unconstitutional).
119. See Beacham, 300 F. Supp. at 184 (allowing a governor, with the approval of
three members of the Cabinet, to use discretion when restoring voting rights).
120. See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 4 (emphasizing the obstacles Floridian
felons face when trying to regain voting rights).
121. Compare TENN. CONST. art. I, § 5 (disenfranchising those who commit
infamous crimes in Tennessee), with Verity, 2014 WL 3053171, at *1 (allowing a five
to seven year waiting period in Florida).
122. See Voting Tennessee, supra note 33 (discussing Tennessee’s complex voting
laws).
123. See O’Neal v. Goins, No. M2015-01337-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 4083466, at
*1, *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 29, 2016) (requiring the court to discretionally provide a
felon with a certificate of restoration before a restoration of rights is possible).
124. Compare 25 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2602 (West 2012) (regulating
only incarcerated felons, with no requirements of waiting periods or applications to a
court or Governor), with FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4(a) (preventing persons convicted of
felonies from voting until their civil rights have been restored), and TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 40-29-202(b) (2013) (requiring felons to pay all debts).
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1996 may petition for administrative restoration of rights.125 Tennessee’s
requirements easily confuse felons in that state, potentially accounting for
why so few felons have regained their right to vote.126
Additionally, Tennessee’s laws require that an ex-felon pay his courtordered restitution and child support obligations before becoming eligible
for voting rights, which also greatly hinders a felon’s ability to quickly
restore his voting rights.127 If a felon fails to comply, the court can deny a
certificate of restoration.128 However, eligibility is not freely given, even if
a felon meets these requirements.129 A state election coordinator will look
at the eligibility of a felon and communicate to the administrator of
elections whether or not a felon is truly eligible to gain back his voting
rights; this act, too, is done discretionally.130
While Pennsylvania courts have recognized that restricting an
incarcerated felon’s rights is within their constitutional power,
Pennsylvania has chosen not to implement laws that confuse and hinder
any felons right to vote after being released from prison.131 Alternatively,
both Florida and Tennessee have multiple requirements that both confuse
and hinder the process.132 Court ordered restoration and Governor
approved restoration results in only a small amount of felons restoring their
rights after a period of nearly twenty years.133 These court orders and
125. See Voting Tennessee, supra note 33 (discussing Tennessee’s irrational and
confusing felon voting laws).
126. See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 13, 15 (showing that of the 421,227 felons
disenfranchised in Tennessee, this requirement of court ordered restoration only
restored voting rights to approximately 11,500 felons in a twenty-five-year period).
127. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-29-202(b)-(c) (2013).
128. See O’Neal, 2016 WL 4083466, at *5-6 (listing eligibility requirements such
as receiving a pardon, discharge from custody after serving the maximum sentence, or
being granted a certificate of final discharge from supervision of the board of parole).
129. See id. at *1, *6 (recognizing that, even if a felon meets the requirements of
eligibility, the state election coordinator still holds discretion in restoring voting rights).
130. See id. at *6 (explaining that the state election coordinator may formulate a
uniform procedure for verifying registration eligibility of felon).
131. See Owens v. Barnes, 711 F.2d 25, 27 (3d Cir. 1983) (denying laws with no
rational basis that restrict voting rights); see also, UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 4
(highlighting that Pennsylvania disenfranchises felons only during the incarceration
period).
132. See Verity v. Scott, No. 2:12-cv-609-FtM-38, 2014 WL 3053171, at *3-*4
(M.D. Fla. July 7, 2014) (explaining that, because clemency in Florida is controlled by
the governor, the Clemency board rules may change with each new administration);
Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 745 (6th Cir. 2010) (stating that the ability to pay
off debts is a prerequisite to voting right restoration in Tennessee).
133. See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 13, 15 (estimating that during a 15-year
period Florida and Tennessee have restored voting rights to only 283,583 ex-felons
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governor approval restoration methods both allow a figure to discretionally
and unfairly apply voting rights to some felons while denying others.134
If Florida and Tennessee were to follow Pennsylvania’s approach to
disenfranchisement statutes, they would drastically increase the number of
eligible voters in their states, restoring rights of people who have served
their time.135 When nearly two million people are disenfranchised from
voting based on non-violent convictions, the governments of these states
are effectively hindering a person’s fundamental right to vote entirely.136
It is clear why the courts have allowed felon disenfranchisement laws
generally.137 It is also clear why in some states like Tennessee, those who
commit the most egregious crimes will be permanently disenfranchised.138
However, the United States Supreme Court has established that voting is
one of the most basic rights given to us through the United States
Constitution.139 In Pennsylvania, unlike Tennessee and Florida, the courts
have recognized that the state has no interest in crafting waiting periods or
complicated procedures for restoration of voting rights.140 Neither Florida
nor Tennessee has provided a clear reason for refusing to restore voting

while more than two million individuals remain disenfranchised).
134. See FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4(a) (refusing to allow any felon to vote unless he
has had his civil rights restored); FLA. STAT. § 940.01(1) (2003) (permitting the
governor, along with two members of the cabinet, to discretionarily restore civil
rights); see also TENN. CONST. art. I, § 5 (denying voting rights to ex-felons without
discretionary court-ordered approval).
135. See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 15 (demonstrating that Pennsylvania has
substantially less disenfranchised felons than Florida and Tennessee).
136. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (holding that the right to vote
is fundamental); Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1234-35 (11th Cir. 2005)
(stating that policy decisions are up to the state government, not federal courts).
137. See Ray v. Pennsylvania, 263 F. Supp. 630, 631 (W.D. Pa. 1967) (explaining
that incarcerated felons have the right to mail, the right to unlimited access to the
courts, and the right to purchase and receive law books, but not the right to vote);
Governor of Fla., 405 F3d at 1234-35 (finding that states have authority to set public
policy).
138. See TENN. CONST. art. I, § 5 (defining infamous crimes as murder, rape,
treason, or voter fraud).
139. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555 (declaring the right of suffrage to be a
fundamental right in a democratic society).
140. Compare Mixon v. Commonwealth, 759 A.2d 442, 451-53 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2000) (rejecting post-sentence the waiting period), with Verity v. Scott, No. 2:12-cv609-FtM-38, 2014 WL 3053171, at *8-9 (M.D. Fla. July 7, 2014) (upholding a waiting
period of five to seven years in Florida), and Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 753
(6th Cir. 2010) (requiring payment of debts in addition to other requirements before
being allowed to restore voting rights).
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rights to an ex-felon after he has completed his sentencing.141 If Tennessee
and Florida truly want to uphold the right of suffrage as one of the United
States’ most basic and fundamental rights, they should adopt the more
inclusive felon disenfranchisement laws in place in states like
Pennsylvania.142
B. The Restriction of Felons’ Voting Rights in Florida and Tennessee
Should Constitute Cruel and Unusual Punishment Under the Eighth
Amendment
Currently, felons in states which require the completion of prison, parole,
probation, and a post-sentence waiting period have no reasonable,
achievable means to restore their right to vote.143 While these states claim
the right will be returned after applying to a clemency board or court, the
current number of felons disenfranchised in these states demonstrates how
these insurmountable requirements lead to a marginal amount of
restorations.144 Moreover, these felons have no guarantee that their rights
will ever be restored because the courts have consistently allowed this right
to be given back discretionally.145
Despite having the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act of
1965 as outlets to pursue, both of which were created to better provide men
and women the right to vote, courts have consistently chosen to dismiss
challenges to felon disenfranchisement statutes.146
The Fourteenth
141. Compare Bredesen, 624 F.3d at 745 (explaining that a state is within its rights
to require debt payment), with Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d at 1218 (relying on historical
tradition to justify disenfranchising felons).
142. Compare FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4(a) (requiring felons with even non-violent
convictions to apply to the Governor for restoration of voting rights), and TENN. CODE
ANN. § 40-29-202(b) (2013) (requiring felons to pay all debts prior to restoring their
right to vote), with 25 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2602 (West 2012)
(disenfranchising incarcerated felons and not creating barriers, such as waiting periods
or application requirements, against individuals who have completed their sentences).
143. See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 3 (stating that individuals who are in the
twelve states that disenfranchise people post-sentence and who have completed their
sentences constitute more than fifty percent of the entire disenfranchised population,
totaling almost 3.1 million people).
144. See id. at 13, 15 (demonstrating that, of those currently disenfranchised,
twenty-three percent are incarcerated while seventy-seven percent have finished their
sentences and are living in their communities, or are under supervision through
probation or parole).
145. See O’Neal v. Goins, No. M2015-01337-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 4083466, at
*1, *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 29, 2016) (allowing a court to restore voting rights
discretionally); see also Beacham v. Braterman, 300 F. Supp. 182, 184 (S.D. Fla. 1969)
(allowing a governor to restore voting rights discretionally).
146. See, e.g., Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d at 1228-29 (denying both claims under
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Amendment and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 seem like the most obvious
ways to challenge felon disenfranchisement laws, perhaps accounting for
the plethora of cases that have already brought challenges under this
Amendment and Act.147
However, both the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act of
1965 are essentially inaccessible for felon disenfranchisement claims.148
Even when presented with overwhelming evidence that felons are being
discriminatorily disenfranchised, the courts continue to dismiss challenges
under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act of 1965
because these laws were not crafted with the intent of discriminating
Additionally, the prevalence of felon
against minorities.149
disenfranchisement statutes throughout America’s history have allowed
courts to seemingly ignore the 6.1 million people in the United States who
have a small probability of ever regaining their right to vote back despite
the United States Supreme Court’s confirmation that voting is a
fundamental right.150
While both the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act of
1965 are effectively prevented from providing any relief to felons wishing
to restore their voting rights, the Eighth Amendment should provide felons
with the tools to overrule these oppressive, unbeatable laws currently
existing in twelve states.151 For the most part, the courts have largely
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 because these
protections exist to halt discrimination, rather than undo policies that have been
accepted and permitted throughout history, e.g., felon disenfranchisement).
147. See id. (challenging felon disenfranchisement laws on both Fourteenth
Amendment and Voting Rights Act of 1965 grounds).
148. Compare Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54-56 (1974) (upholding a
felon disenfranchisement law under the Fourteenth Amendment, unless discrimination
is found), with Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985) (upholding felon
disenfranchisement laws under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, unless discrimination is
proven).
149. See Hunter, 471 U.S. at 233 (explaining that if voting qualifications deny
citizens the right to vote and were crafted with the intent to discriminate against a race,
those qualifications would be held unconstitutional); see also UGGEN ET AL., supra note
8, at 3 (stating that Florida and Tennessee each separately disenfranchise twenty-one
percent of its African-Americans with more than one in five African-Americans in
these states disenfranchised).
150. See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 48-49 (referring to the fact that after the Civil
War, the Union approved southern states’ Constitutions—many of which contained
felon disenfranchisement statutes); see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 559-60
(1964) (explaining that voting is fundamental right).
151. Compare Richardson, 418 U.S. at 53 (allowing disenfranchisement because
factors such as age and residence are considered), and Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d
102, 129 (2d Cir. 2004) (providing that statutes must not alter the balance of power
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ignored and dismissed Eighth Amendment claims challenging felon
disenfranchisement laws without much thought.152 The courts that have
discussed Eighth Amendment claims, simply dismiss them because they
assert that felon disenfranchisement statutes should be analyzed under the
Amendment or Act that deal substantively with voting rights.153
However, the courts only choose to truly analyze these statutes under the
Fourteenth Amendment or Voting Rights Act of 1965 when a statute has
been created with the intent to discriminate, leaving no viable outlet for
felons.154 Nonetheless, it has been held that because only a few states
require an application to a court or clemency board to restore voting rights,
these laws cannot be considered cruel and unusual.155 This argument is a
feeble one when it is nearly impossible to restore voting rights because
these states often allow these rights to be approved or denied
discretionally.156 If these few states only accounted for a small amount of
people with repressed rights, then the argument for felon
disenfranchisement laws might seem less compelling.157 However, when
6.1 million felons are disenfranchised nationwide, and the state of Florida
alone accounts for more than a quarter of the disenfranchised population
nationally, it is not merely a small percentage of people disenfranchised.158

between the states and the federal government), with Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958) (proscribing a modern interpretation of the Eighth Amendment which considers
society’s current understanding of cruel and unusual).
152. See Green v. Bd. of Elections of N.Y., 380 F.2d 445, 451-52 (2d Cir. 1967)
(dismissing cruel and unusual punishment challenges immediately because these
functions are a non-penal exercise of the power to regulate, and tradition permits it).
153. See Thiess v. State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 387 F. Supp. 1038, 1039-40,
1042-43 (D. Md. 1974) (finding that only the Fourteenth Amendment should apply to
felon disenfranchisement laws).
154. See Hunter, 471 U.S. at 220 (holding that disenfranchisement statutes that
deny citizens the right to vote because of their race are unconstitutional).
155. See El-Amin v. McDonnell, No. 3:12-cv-00538-JAG, 2013 WL 1193357, at
*6-7 (E.D. Va. Mar. 22, 2013) (explaining that the widespread enactment of felon
disenfranchisement laws proves that even the strictest laws are not cruel and unusual
punishment).
156. Compare Beacham v. Braterman, 300 F. Supp. 182, 184 (S.D. Fla. 1969)
(allowing a governor to restore voting rights discretionally), with O’Neal v. Goins, No.
M2015-01337-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 4083466, at *1, *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 29,
2016) (dismissing a complaint stating that discretional approval by the court for
restoration of voting rights was unconstitutional).
157. See Owens v. Barnes, 711 F.2d 25, 27 (3d Cir. 1983) (allowing a
disenfranchisement provision because it only disenfranchised a small portion of felons
and granted voting rights to non-incarcerated felons in general).
158. See UGGEN ET AL. supra note 8, at 3 (highlighting that Florida’s nearly 1.5
million disenfranchised post-sentence citizens account for nearly half of the national
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Although courts have essentially ignored the Eighth Amendment felon
disenfranchisement claim because they do not consider it punishment per
se, the nature of disenfranchisement is fundamentally punitive, and
accordingly, falls within the confines of cruel and unusual punishment.159
Each of the cases that have extended the Eighth Amendment’s definition of
cruel and unusual punishment provide one of several arguments as to why
felon disenfranchisement laws constitute cruel and unusual punishment.160
For example, the Court in Weems found that a punishment must be
proportional to the offense.161 The Court recognized in Weems that even
after Weems finished his sentence he would forever be kept under the
shadow of his crime and would likely never retrieve his fall from
rectitude.162 This perpetual limitation of his liberty was not proportional to
his crime.163 When considering the twelve states that nearly permanently
disenfranchise felons, it is questionable to definitively argue that this
essentially permanent punishment is proportional to the committed
offense.164 Each of these 6.1 million felons is kept within the shadow of his
or her crimes, unable to move forward.165
In Tennessee and Florida alone, many felons are excluded from the
franchise discretionally.166 The law does not consider whether the felon
total).
159. See Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (considering
felon disenfranchisement laws acceptable because the states were given the power to
regulate elections).
160. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962) (proscribing
punishments that criminalize addiction as cruel and unusual); see also Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (advocating for a modern interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 381 (1910) (calling for
punishments to be proportional to the crime).
161. See Weems, 217 U.S. at 381 (explaining that for Weems, a sentence of fifteen
years was not proportional to his crime of falsifying an official public document).
162. See id. at 366 (arguing that even when a felon is released from prison he would
still be “subject to tormenting regulations that . . . deprive [citizens] of essential
liberty.”).
163. See id. at 367 (stating it is necessary that the punishment be graduated and
proportional to the offense).
164. See Felony Disenfranchisement, supra note 10, at 1 (explaining that the
restoration process is so cumbersome that few people take advantage of it).
165. Compare Weems, 217 U.S. at 366 (explaining after a felon leaves prison he
may not be imprisoned with iron bars and stone walls but he will still be oppressed due
to the deprivation of liberty that follows), with UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 3
(highlighting that 6.1 million people in the United States are currently unable to regain
voting rights).
166. Compare Beacham v. Braterman, 300 F. Supp. 182, 184 (S.D. Fla. 1969)
(allowing a governor to restore voting rights discretionally), with O’Neal v. Goins, No.
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committed a non-violent drug felony or is simply unable to pay his debts
because he has struggled to obtain and maintain employment.167 Weems v.
United States recognizes that cruel and unusual does not just apply
exclusively to punishments that inflict torture or incarceration but also
those which, by their excessive length or severity, are greatly
disproportionate to the offenses charged.168
It is generally understood that when a prisoner pays his debt to society,
he will emerge from prison rehabilitated.169 When a felon leaves prison,
the purpose of his punishment is fulfilled and the crime is repressed by
penalties of just, not tormenting severity.170 This discourages the felon
from repeating prior crimes.171 By denying felons their basic rights, it is
clear that these states have no interest in restoring voting rights, but rather
intend to further punish them outside the scope of their original
punishment.172 Instead, these states choose to enact punishments that carry
on long after the crime and sentencing is completed, clearly permitting
disproportionate punishments in violation of Weems v. United States.173
While crimes like murder or rape seem to justify a complete denial of
voting rights, crimes like possession of controlled substances or other drug
related felonies are small in comparison and disproportionate to the
M2015-01337-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 4083466, at *1, *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 29,
2016) (permitting discretional approval by the court for restoration of rights).
167. Compare FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (withholding voting rights to all felons),
with Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 753 (6th Cir. 2010) (requiring a felon to pay
roughly $40,000 in order to begin the process of restoration of his civil rights).
168. See Weems, 217 U.S. at 369-71 (discussing the evolution of the Eighth
Amendment in the courts and how its protections do not simply cover punishments that
inflict pain or physical harm).
169. Compare Ray v. Pennsylvania, 263 F. Supp. 630, 631 (W.D. Pa. 1967)
(allowing the restriction of a felon’s civil rights during sentencing), with Mixon v.
Commonwealth, 759 A.2d 442, 451 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000) (holding that once
released from prison, there is no reason to continue depriving voting rights).
170. See Weems, 217 U.S. at 381 (explaining that the state operates best, suffers
nothing, and loses no power when it releases a felon after the completion of a
sentence).
171. See id. (explaining that hope is given for the reformation of the criminal when
a felon is released).
172. Compare Verity v. Scott, No. 2:12-cv-609-FtM-38, 2014 WL 3053171, at *5
(M.D. Fla. July 7, 2014) (explaining that the previous governor of Florida loosened
restrictions on restoration of voting rights for felons, but the current governor reinstated
the more restrictive waiting period), with Bredesen, 624 F.3d at 745 (noting that, while
payment of debts has not always been a requirement, the state may institute this more
restrictive change).
173. See Weems, 217 U.S. at 366 (stating that it is precept of justice when
punishment for a crime is proportionate to the offense).
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punishment of disenfranchisement.174
Furthermore, in states like
Tennessee and Florida, the states claim that the right to vote may easily be
given back, but in practice these requirements are insurmountable,
requiring significant time, money, and status to be one of the special
individuals granted restoration.175 The majority of these felons whose
rights are essentially permanently taken away are adults who live, work,
and pay taxes in their communities, and thus, the deprivation is cruel and
unusual punishment.176
Because only twelve out of fifty states implement this kind of restriction
on ex-felons, it is clear that this deprivation of rights is not widespread
throughout the United States.177 If a majority of the states incurred this
restriction, then the argument that deprivation of felon voting rights
constituted cruel and unusual punishment would be moot.178 Rather,
several states have chosen to lessen their felon voting restrictions
substantially, recognizing the unfairness in felony voting laws and making
the argument stronger that these restrictions are cruel and unusual
punishment.179
If the United States Supreme Court chooses to ignore that the
punishment of nearly permanent disenfranchisement is not proportional to
the majority of crimes committed by felons, the argument that the Eighth
Amendment is held to evolving standards still demonstrates that restrictive

174. See FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (placing limitations on any felon, regardless of the
crime convicted, from voting); see also TENN. CONST. art. I, § 5 (precluding those who
commit the most egregious of crimes from voting permanently).
175. Compare Beacham v. Braterman, 300 F. Supp. 182, 184 (S.D. Fla. 1969)
(permitting the governor to restore voting discretionarily), with O’Neal v. Goins, No.
M2015-01337-COA-R3-CV, at *1, *8 (allowing discretional approval by the court for
restoration of voting rights), and UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 3 (naming both Florida
and Tennessee among the six states that disenfranchise more than seven percent of the
adult population in their state).
176. See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 14 (explaining that, if the laws were
changed to require a felon to have his rights restored for people on probation or parole,
seventy-seven percent of the 6.1 million people currently disenfranchised would regain
the right to vote).
177. See id. at 3-4 (highlighting that the near total deprivation of voting rights most
frequently occurs in the states whose laws continue to disenfranchise individuals after
they complete their prison sentences).
178. Cf. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1220 (11th Cir. 2005) (relying
on tradition to demonstrate that felon disenfranchisement was always considered
constitutional).
179. See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 4 (demonstrating that in 2013, Delaware
removed the five-year waiting period and in 2016 Maryland eliminated the ban on
voting for persons on probation or under parole supervision).
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felon disenfranchisement laws constitute cruel and unusual punishment.180
Both Weems v. United States and Trop v. Dulles provide an argument for
why certain felon disenfranchisement laws should fall under a modern
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment
clause.181 In Trop v. Dulles, the Court announced that the Eighth
Amendment should draw its meaning from the “evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”182 Similarly, in
Weems, the Court explained that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
could be progressive and change as public opinion becomes enlightened by
a humane justice.183 The Court’s adoption of a modern interpretation of the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment clause procures that if society understands
the deprivation of voting rights as unjust punishment, then felon
disenfranchisement statutes would be unconstitutional.184
As more states depart from post-sentencing restrictions and court or
clemency board approval, states that impose the harshest restrictions are
receiving increased scrutiny and disapproval.185 The duties of citizenship
are numerous, many of these obligations being essential to the security and
well-being of the nation.186 Depriving someone of her right to vote
essentially cripples that person from carrying out her duties of
citizenship.187
180. Compare Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910) (stating that the
Eighth Amendment “may therefore be progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete,
but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by humane justice”),
with Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (reasoning that the words of the
Eighth Amendment are not precise, and their scope is not static).
181. Compare Weems, 217 U.S. at 378 (arguing for a modern interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment), with Trop, 356 U.S. at 102-3 (explaining that a modern
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment is necessary).
182. Trop, 356 U.S. at 102-03 (adopting a modern interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment because expatriation for the crime of desertion went far beyond the normal
punishment).
183. See Weems, 217 U.S. at 373 (stating that “a principle, to be vital, must be
capable of wider application than the mischief to which it give it birth.”).
184. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 102-03 (expressing that a modern interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment might better serve today’s society); see also UGGEN ET AL., supra
note 8, at 3 (highlighting that there are currently six million disenfranchised felons in
the United States).
185. See Felony Disenfranchisement, supra note 10, at 2-3 (listing recent policy
changes in eighteen states).
186. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 92 (reasoning that citizenship cannot be revoked every
time a duty of citizenship is shirked).
187. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 559-560 (1964) (stating that the right to
vote is fundamental); Trop, 356 U.S. at 92 (permitting Trop to keep his citizenship);
Verity v. Scott, No. 2:12-cv-609-FtM-38, 2014 WL 3053171, at *8 (M.D. Fla. July 7,
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Although cruel and unusual punishment typically only applies to the
most egregious of punishments, the United States Supreme Court extends it
when faced with an injustice.188 In Robinson v. California, the Court
recognized that depriving someone of a liberty for something menial is
unjust.189 Alternatively, while expatriation was not something generally
deemed as cruel and unusual, the Court reasoned that deprivation of
citizenship is not a weapon that the Government may use to express its
displeasure at a citizen’s conduct, no matter how reprehensible that conduct
might be.190
Felon disenfranchisement laws requiring waiting periods and Governor
approval could also be seen as a penal law because they disenfranchise so
many people.191 Trop sets forth the idea that the basic concept underlying
the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.192 It is less
than the dignity of man to require someone to pay nearly fifty-thousand
dollars to restore his right to vote after completing his prison sentence.193
Similarly, requiring an individual to wait five to seven years after
completion of his sentence to apply for restoration appears to be an attempt
to further punish felons outside the boundaries of the original sentence.194
This waiting period bares striking similarity to the concept articulated in
Weems v. United States that even after men and women are released from
prison they have a shadow over them that deprives them of their liberty at
2014) (allowing waiting periods before restoration of voting rights).
188. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 661-62 (1962) (holding that
criminalization of addiction is cruel and unusual punishment); Trop, 356 U.S. at 101
(considering expatriation cruel and unusual punishment); Weems, 217 U.S. at 362
(finding excessive imprisonment for falsification of a document cruel and unusual
punishment).
189. See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667 (explaining that “even one day in prison would
be a cruel and unusual punishment for the ‘crime’ of having a common cold.”).
190. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 92-93 (reasoning that citizenship cannot be revoked
every time a duty of citizenship is shirked).
191. Compare UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 15 (highlighting that felons in Florida
and Tennessee account for nearly two million of the six million disenfranchised
felons), with Trop, 356 U.S. at 97 (stating that the denial of rights was a penal
punishment because the punishment was disproportionate to the crime).
192. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 102-03 (recognizing that the Eighth Amendment stands
to assure that its power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards).
193. Cf. Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 753 (6th Cir. 2010) (requiring a felon
to pay $40,000 restitution for wire fraud and more than $1,000 in child support in order
to regain his right to vote was constitutional).
194. Compare Mixon v. Commonwealth, 759 A.2d 442, 451-53 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2000) (rejecting waiting periods in Pennsylvania), with Verity v. Scott, No. 2:12-cv609-FtM-38, 2014 WL 3053171, at *8 (M.D. Fla. July 7, 2014) (permitting waiting
periods that were recently implemented by the current governor of Florida).
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any chance available.195
In Florida, felons are faced with the reality that they must wait several
years just to begin the process of applying for restoration of voting
rights.196 This waiting period is clearly not proportional to the crime.197
Pennsylvania found that there was no just reason to require a felon to wait
this extended amount of time because it was beneath the dignity of man. 198
Pennsylvania recognizes that in many cases disenfranchisement is not
proportional to the crime.199 Felons released from prison should be entitled
to the fundamental right to vote.200
Since the courts have established that the Fourteenth Amendment and
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 effectively preclude all felon
disenfranchisement challenges, it is up to the courts to recognize that the
Eighth Amendment provides an opportunity to fix the wrongs implemented
by twelve states.201
The courts must open the door to felon
disenfranchisement succeeding under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause of the Eighth Amendment.202

195. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366 (1910) (arguing that
punishments can be ongoing long after the period of incarceration ends).
196. Compare id. at 366 (explaining that after prison a person is often kept within
voice and view of a magistrate), with Verity, 2014 WL 3053171, at *5 (allowing for a
waiting period that was implemented by the current governor of Florida).
197. Compare Weems, 217 U.S. at 366-68 (considering hard labor for falsifying
documents cruel and unusual punishment), with Verity, 2014 WL 3053171, at *1
(permitting a waiting period that continues for nearly a decade).
198. See Mixon, 759 A.2d at 445 (recognizing there was no legitimate reason to say
a felon was in a better position to vote because he had been out of prison for five
years).
199. Compare Weems, 217 U.S. at 366 (introducing punishment being
proportionate with crime), with Mixon, 759 A.2d at 445 (recognizing that the
punishment was not proportionate to the crime).
200. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 559-60 (1964) (explaining that the right
of suffrage is a fundamental right).
201. Compare Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974) (denying felon
disenfranchisement challenges under the Fourteenth Amendment), and Farrakhan v.
Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1016 (9th Cir. 2003) (denying felon disenfranchisement
challenges under the Voting Rights Act of 1965), with Weems, 217 U.S. at 362
(requiring punishment be proportional to the crime and opening up the Eighth
Amendment to modern interpretation).
202. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (adopting a modern interpretation
of the Eighth Amendment leaves many arguments available as society continues to
progress).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol25/iss3/3

28

Heath: Cruel and Unusual Punishment
HEATH 3/9/2017(DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

5/23/2017 6:59 PM

355

IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATION
One of the staples of American democracy is the right to vote in
elections.203 While the United States has not always provided each
individual in America with the right to vote, as society progresses we have
seen voting rights expanded to those who have been oppressed.204 After the
Civil War, voting rights were given to African-American slaves, despite the
Founding Fathers’ intent to disenfranchise slaves.205 After the woman’s
suffrage movement, voting rights were given to women even though when
“all men are created equal” was written in the Constitution it was intended
to only refer to white men.206 When African-American’s rights were still
being denied, a Voting Rights Act was created to ensure that every person
had the opportunity to vote in America.207
Currently, 6.1 million people are forbidden from voting in the United
States because they have committed felonies.208 The percent of felons
disenfranchised is even higher among minorities, specifically within the
African-American population.209 Twelve states and legislatures claim it is
better to have ex-felons apply to have their civil rights restored only well
after they have been released from prison.210 However, research has shown
203. See Presidential Elections, HIST. CHANNEL, http://www.history.com/topics/uspresidents/presidential-elections (last visited Nov. 4, 2016) (explaining that the United
States left the British monarchical tradition and created a system where people could
vote and select their leaders).
204. See U.S. Voting Rights Timeline, N. CAL. CITIZENSHIP PROJECT, 1-5
http://www.kqed.org/assets/pdf/education/digitalmedia/us-voting-rights-timeline.pdf
(highlighting how voting rights have been expanded since 1776 to include AfricanAmericans and women).
205. See The Civil War: The Senate’s Story, UNITED STATES SENATE,
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/CivilWarAmendments.ht
m (last visited Nov. 4, 2016) (explaining the admission of the Civil War Amendments).
206. See id. (highlighting that it took 100 years for women voting rights to be
implemented).
207. See Jamelle Bouie, The Voting Rights Act: A 20th Century American
Recolution, AMERICAN PROSPECT (Aug. 6, 2012) http://prospect.org/article/votingrights-act-20th-century-american-revolution (explaining that previously, the ability for
African-Americans to vote was virtually nonexistent).
208. See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 3 (highlighting that 2.5 percent of the total
U.S. voting age population — one of every forty adults — is disenfranchised due to a
felony conviction).
209. See Editorial, Florida Should Restore Ex-Felon Voting Rights, SUN SENTINEL
(August 31, 2016), http://www.sun-sentinel.com/opinion/editorials/fl-editorial-felonsvoting-20160829-story.html (noting that in Florida alone felon disenfranchisement
laws disqualify nearly one in four African-American residents from casting ballots).
210. See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 13 (showing that even though states claim
these restrictive rules are better, these states generally do not provide restoration to
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that felons in states who are given back their right to vote after being
released from prison with a reasonable time frame are far less likely to
become repeat offenders.211
Additionally, efforts to change felon disenfranchisement laws have come
to the forefront of conversations during election years.212 In the summer of
2016, the Governor of Virginia executed a blanket restoration of voting
rights for felons who had completed their sentences that was quickly
overturned by the Virginia Supreme Court.213 As more states move away
from post-sentencing restrictions and court or clemency board approval,
states that impose the harshest restrictions are receiving additional scrutiny
and disapproval.214
Felons like Perry Hopkins and Desmond Meade have paid back their
debts to society, yet they are precluded from one of the most sacred rights
in our society.215 At this point, it is not necessary to claim that all felon
disenfranchisement laws should be unconstitutional.216 Depriving someone
of the right to vote because of transgressions committed against society
should be allowed as tradition at the time of the Ratification demonstrates
that our Founder Fathers accepted it.217 However, our Founding Fathers
also allowed many other things that are now repugnant.
Felon
disenfranchisement laws in states that prevent more than seven percent of
adults the right to vote after they have paid back their debts to society
should also be considered repugnant.218
felons).
211. See James Call, Study Shows Ex-Cons Benefit from Rights Restoration, WFSU,
http://news.wfsu.org/post/study-shows-ex-cons-benefit-rights-restoration (explaining
that in Florida, ex-felons, whose rights to vote was automatically restored, were less
likely to commit new crimes).
212. See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 3.
213. See id. at 4 (highlighting that since the Virginia Supreme Court overturned the
blanket restoration, the Governor of Virginia has individually approved voting rights
for 12,832 individuals).
214. See Felony Disenfranchisement, supra note 10, at 2-3 (listing recent policy
changes in eighteen states, which allow for felons to regain their voting rights with
greater ease).
215. Compare Martin, supra note 1 (detailing the struggle Perry Hopkins faced to
regain his right to vote), with Ollstein, supra note 6 (describing Desmond Meade’s
personal life and how he is still being denied the right to vote in Florida).
216. See Ray v. Pennsylvania, 263 F. Supp. 630, 631 (W.D. Pa. 1967) (arguing that
a felon cannot vote while incarcerated because it is only when fundamental, humane,
and necessary rights are breached that constitutional protections become involved).
217. See Green v. Bd. of Elections of N.Y., 380 F.2d 445, 450 (2d Cir. 1967)
(explaining that eleven constitutions adopted between 1776 and 1821 authorized the
legislatures to prohibit exercise of the franchise by convicted felons).
218. See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 12 (asserting that 6.1 million felons
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V. CONCLUSION
Although felon disenfranchisement laws are common throughout the
United States and disenfranchise millions of people, the judicial system has
consistently chosen to permit the states to draft and enforce their own
unique election laws.219 When comparing Pennsylvania, Florida, and
Tennessee, each state has addressed felon disenfranchisement laws in some
way.220 Pennsylvania acknowledges that it maintains the right to enforce
felon disenfranchisement but chooses to do so in the least restrictive
means.221 If Florida and Tennessee were to adopt laws similar to
Pennsylvania they would enfranchise over seven percent of each of their
By not restoring felons’ voting rights, states are
populations.222
intentionally excluding citizens from one of our most basic and
fundamental rights.223
While challenges to these felon disenfranchisement laws generally fail,
there may be a path to success through the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause.224 This clause has only considered three nontraditional punishments to be cruel and unusual, generally because the
punishment is not proportional to the crime.225 If courts were to look at the
proportionality of felon disenfranchisement laws and their punishment, it

disenfranchised reside mostly in states with strict felon disenfranchisement laws).
219. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54-55 (1974) (holding it is not a
court’s decision to determine values).
220. Compare FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4(a) (requiring all felons to apply to the
Governor for restoration of voting rights), and TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-29-202(b)
(2013) (requiring felons to pay all debts prior to restoration), with 25 PA. STAT. AND
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2602 (West 2012) (denying only incarcerated felons voting rights).
221. See Mixon v. Commonwealth, 759 A.2d 442, 451-53 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000)
(condemning waiting periods because waiting periods have not proven to create better
voters).
222. See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 15 (noting that Florida and Tennessee
disenfranchises more than eight percent of its adult population while Pennsylvania only
disenfranchises 0.52 percent).
223. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 559-60 (1964) (explaining that the right
of suffrage is a fundamental right).
224. See Felony Disenfranchisement, supra note 10, at 1-3 (discussing the history
of felon disenfranchisement in the United States and the courts’ consistent failure to
recognize the unconstitutionality of these laws under the Voting Rights Act and the
Fourteenth Amendment).
225. Compare Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 362 (1910) (holding
imprisonment for falsification of an official public document to be cruel and unusual
punishment), with Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958) (finding that expatriation for
desertion is cruel and unusual punishment), and Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660,
661-62 (1962) (holding punishment for addiction to be cruel and unusual punishment).
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would be clear that these laws violate the Eighth Amendment.226

226. See Weems, 217 U.S. at 385-86 (requiring that punishments must be
appropriate and proportional to the crime).
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